Kenneth Allebach: The Politics of Selecting Relocation Housing Sites: A Case-Study of White Plains, New York

 

The Politics of Selecting Relocation Housing Sites: A Case-Study of White Plains, New York

 

Lawrence P. Goldman

Seminar 90

Dr. Edgar Shor

May 12, 1967

 

Preface

 

            This study would not have been possible were it not for the help and encouragement of many people. I thank the many busy individuals who each allowed me an hour or more for interviews. I am grateful for the candor with which, for the most part, they answered my questions.

            I am indebted to Jay Driller, Mike Divney, and Hank Whittemore who tolerated my sometimes incessant questioning during the long weeks when I was steeped in the tedious process of gathering background information.

            Great thanks are due to Kenneth Allebach. The Urban Renewal Director, unlike many public officials, was able to make the vital distinction between scholarly research and journalistic expose. He always treated my pursuits as the former and answered my sometimes delicate inquiries with commensurate frankness. His guidance, suggestions, and constructive criticisms were invaluable in the completion of my work.

            Most of all, I would like to thank Dr. Edgar Shor whose wise and patient instruction and whose insistence on academic soundness rest at the very base of this study.

 

Table of Contents

 

            Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

            The Actors ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11

            Analysis of the Selection of Public Housing Sites ……………………………………. 16

            Conclusion: Politics and Planning in White Plains …………………………………… 43

            Afterword ………………………………………………………………………………………………  48

            Appendices …………………………………………………………………………………………….  ??

            Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………………………… 51

 

Introduction

            White Plains, New York is a city of 50,000 people. It is only recently, however, that the residents of White Plains have begun to recognize the fact that they live in a city and not in a medium size suburban town. Except for the newcomers of the last few years, almost all residents refer to the city as a town. Even the Mayor, who for the past ten years has been deeply steeped in problems and crises that can only occur in an urbanized area, is wont to refer to the “north end of town” and the “fine people of this town.”

            White Plains has become in the last 15 years the major retail center of Westchester County. Moreover, several large industries and businesses – including I.B.M., General Foods, and All-State Insurance – have moved some of their operations to this city. This has naturally created a small-scale influx of semi-skilled and non-skilled labor. The Negro population has been steadily increasing and commensurate residential over crowdedness in the downtown area has followed.

            Yet, the people of White Plains, particularly the old-time residents, have been reluctant to abandon the notion that their area is still an exclusive suburb. Perhaps their reference to the city as a “town” is an unconscious expression of this reluctance. In any case, the days when White Plains was a community of commuters to New York City are gone and will never return. Today, in fact, three times as many people commute to White Plains to make a living as commute from White Plains to New York City. White Plains has become what planners call a satellite city.

            The advent of urbanism is usually accompanied by certain endemic problems. Complex social and economic questions are forced into the open when a town grows into a city, when an essentially residential retreat becomes an important urban center. Whether the emerging city develops the common pathologies of urbanization – blight, degeneration, and economic and social devaluation – or matures into a pleasant community in which to live and work depends greatly on the attitudes and fore-sightedness of the indigenous population and the community leaders. Most importantly, the future of a city is determined by willingness of its citizens to confront the area’s problems directly and on a comprehensive level.

            Fortunately, White Plains has, for the most part, recognized its problems and has slowly started to treat them in a sensible and rational fashion. In the early 1960’s the city contracted an independent and highly respected consultant corporation to elaborate a Comprehensive Development Plan for the city. In the Spring of 1962, the legislative body of the city – the Common Council – created a professional Planning Department to supplement the already established Planning Board whose main function had been to wield authority over zoning matters. The function of the newly created department was to “prepare plans for the city’s orderly growth and to advise the elected officials in the implementation of the plans.”1

            Another significant measure taken by the city in the attempt to alleviate its increasing urban problems was the decision, made in early 1964, to implement a “bussing” system to rectify racial imbalance in public schools. The Negro population was becoming more and more condensed in the downtown area and the neighborhood school plan functioned to isolate Negro children in one or two elementary schools while leaving the others almost totally white. The bussing plan was based on a formula that rearranged the composition of the schools so that no one school was less than 10% nor more than 30% Negro.

            Although White Plains had taken somewhat firm steps to remedy its school and planning problems, there remained on particularly conspicuous blemish in the city. A large sector of the downtown area – sometimes referred to as old White Plains – had declined and degenerated into slum and partial slum conditions. Over 66% of the physical structures in this area – a mixture of houses, apartments, stores, warehouses, industries, and commercial enterprises – were substandard.2 Vacant storefronts, dismal and decaying houses, critically out-of-repair apartments buildings, and a host of marginal businesses cluttered this section. The narrow streets were usually well littered and there was little or no play space for children in most of the area. In short, a major portion of White Plains’ downtown section had been stricken by a cancerous blight that threatened to become malignant and expand outward.

            About 2500-3000 persons live in this area of the city and about one-half are Negro.3 These people were, according to the Bureau of Statistics, mostly in the “modest but adequate” income group; abject poverty was not found to be widespread.4 Although the figures demonstrate that employment is relatively stable and that incomes are adequate among residents of this section, the extremely high property values and rental costs in the rest of the city and outlying areas functioned to virtually “lock” these people into their present homes. In other words, most of these families could not move elsewhere in White Plains.

            It will be important for later analysis to note that on the periphery of this are stands a massive complex of public housing that was built in 1951. These vertical ghettos, although perceived as a progressive measure when built, are now generally considered a blunder by both lay citizens and government officials in White Plains. Any discussion of new public housing, whether it be among supporters or detractors, inevitably includes a statement to the effect: “we don’t want another Winbrook.”

            Urban renewal as a possible remedy for White Plains’ downtown problems was first discussed in the closing years of the 1950’s. At that time, a group of businessmen and other 5community leaders, distressed at the rampant deterioration of a large segment of the city’s core, suggested preliminary investigations as to the feasibility of White Plains receiving federal funds for urban rejuvenation under the 1954 Housing Act. The city acted upon these suggestions and in September of 1959, The Housing and Home Finance Agency – gave the city initial certification for a workable program for community improvement. At this point, both the goals and the scope of urban renewal in White Plains were extremely vague. At very least it may be said that the community leaders who originally proposed an examination of urban renewal for the city never dreamed that it would reach the dimensions that it has today: a plan that schedules the major portion of downtown White Plains for demolition and redevelopment.5

            That the Central Renewal Project has grown so huge is a result of a plethora of interrelated factors that are of no real concern here. It is useful to point out, however, that the project will renovate an area of over 130 acres and will include the demolition of more than 550 buildings.6 The project is one of the ten largest in the country, a fact that has even greater impact when the relatively small size of the city is considered. In short, the scope of the project has expanded far beyond anything envisaged by those who initially fostered the idea. As the director of the White Plains Urban Renewal Agency, Kenneth Allebach, has said:

                        “As this program developed, the city began committing itself more and more,

                        never being quite sure what, in the long run, it was committing itself to.”7

 

            From the preliminary certification by the HHFA in 1959 to the final approval of White Plains’ Application and the signing of the Central Renewal contract with the Department of Housing and Urban Development in July of 1965, the program had been in the “planning stage.” One of the most nagging, yet crucial problems that had to, by law, be resolved in this stage was the question of what to do with the residents of the area who were to be displaced by the project. Relocation housing had to be provided for all of the people who lived in the area. Not until the city could demonstrate that ample housing resources did exist or were being built could the project receive the necessary funds to move from the planning to the execution phase.

            Thus, the success and indeed the very existence of urban renewal in White Plains rested quite heavily on the city’s ability to resolve the question of relocation housing. The professional staff of the Urban Renewal Agency, the Mayor, The Common Council, and other officials and citizens committed to making renewal an actuality were well aware of the large number of programs in other cities that died ingloriously in the planning stage because of stalemated housing controversies. The prospect of rehousing a vast number of slum or semi-slum dwellers, many of who belong to nationality or racial minority groups, inevitably elicits some ugly responses from previously silent, even benign members of a community. In an upper-middle class, formerly residential suburb, the indignation and rumblings of dissent are probably magnified.

            The supporters of urban renewal in White Plains were thus confronted with a prodigious problem that had to be handled with utmost caution. There are essentially three alternative solutions to the question of relocation, all of which must be implemented for a successful program. First, and least functional in a city like White Plains, is the securing of dwelling units through the open real-estate market. Secondly, federally operated middle-income housing can be built, or taken advantage of if already in existence. Thirdly, and probably most common, is the use of present or newly constructed public housing.

            The city, of course, would have to utilize all three alternatives in order to supply enough housing and to satisfy the different needs and requirement of those to be displaced. In total, about one thousand families would have to be relocated and roughly half of these were eligible for public housing.8 It should be noted at this point that “eligible for public housing” in White Plains is somewhat euphemistic; that is, the rentals of private dwelling units is so costly in the city (an average of more than $180 per month)9 that the only alternative to public housing for many families would be to leave White Plains to live elsewhere.

            Finally, it is of primary significance to point out that Negro families comprise both 50% of all families living in the urban renewal area and approximately 50% of those eligible for public housing.10 The latter is of particular relevance to the decisions being studied in this paper in that an intense fear of Negro proliferation underlay the opposition to several of the proposed public housing sites. On the other hand, support by certain PTA groups and the School Board of various sites was based on a desire to create (or maintain) racial balance in the schools of the city.

            The only existing public housing in White Plains – The Winbrook project – showed little promise as a potential resource because of the total lack of vacancies and, in addition, a sizable waiting list. It became apparent, then, that in order for White Plains to proceed with urban renewal, a large amount of new public housing was a concomitant necessity. Early in the 1960’s, the anticipated need called for about 350 additional units. In order for the federal Public Housing Administration to commit the requisite funds, the city had to demonstrate a viable program for building the new housing and feasible site selections. Until these stipulations had been met, te city would not receive the 27-million-dollar federal grant and 39-million-dollar federal loan, and the 7-million-dollar New York State grant11  that would enable it to move from the planning to the execution stage of the project.

            Therefore, in order to ensure the actuality of urban renewal in White Plains, the city officials were completed to arrive at certain crucial decisions about the kind and location of new public housing in the city. Richard Hendey, the Mayor of White Plains, recognized from the very beginning the difficulties the city would inevitably confront in the selection of new public housing sites:

“Selection of sites for low rent housing is one of the most difficult and sensitive   

            decisions which has to be made in connection with urban renewal. While most citizens a

            agree that public housing is necessary to provide decent housing for families of low        

            income, hardly anyone can agree on the location of such in existing neighborhoods.”12

 

The Actors

            Prior to the explanation and analysis of the decisions that determined the location of the new public housing sites, it is useful to enumerate the actors. For our purposes the actors will be defined as those individuals or groups who actually made decisions, or who tried to influence decisions; in other words, the actors are those who participated in or attempted to participate in the decision-making process. This section of the study does not undertake to analyze the role of each group, nor does it seek to measure the relative power or influence of the various groups. Rather, this is solely for the purpose of identifying the important participants and briefly describing their formal or alleged functions.

Governmental Actors

The Mayor.

            The Mayor of White Plains has been, since 1958, Richard Hendey. He, like all other elected officials in the City, is a Republican. In fact, White Plains has never in its 51 years as a chartered city had a Democrat in the Mayoralty or on the Common Council.

            The Mayor is elected every two years by the entire city and, in general is charged with the usual executive responsibilities. In addition, the Mayor is a voting member of the Common Council and Chairman of the city’s Urban Renewal Agency.

 

 

The Common Council.

The council consists of the Mayor and six Councilmen who are elected at large every four years. Candidates for the Council are chosen by the 92-member White Plains Republican committee at a city convention meeting. The Republican nomination in White Plains is tantamount to election.

            The Common Council has the usual legislative functions but is only a part-time body having to meet, by law, at least once a month. During the relocation housing controversy, however, the Council often met several times a week.

The Urban Renewal Agency.

Originally the Department of Urban Renewal (established in October of 1960), the status was changed to that of an agency for financial reasons in 1965. The Agency is comprised of four members of the Common Council and the Mayor who acts as Chairman. Administration of the Agency is carried out by the Director, Kenneth Allebach, and Assistant Director, Myron Orlofsky. The Agency also employs a professional staff of about 25 individuals.

The Planning Board.

            The Board has eight members appointed by the Mayor and functions to make recommendations to the Mayor and Council on zoning matters. Also, the Board makes suggestions relating to general city planning. The members of the Board are ordinary citizens of White Plains who meet periodically.

 

 

 

The White Plains Housing Authority.

            This agency, established pursuant to a State enabling law, determines the need for and the plans of public housing in the city. The Authority is responsible for constructing new public housing and managing that which already exists. The Housing Authority is an autonomous, public-corporate entity, established by the Common Council in line with the State enabling law. Five commissioners appointed by the Mayor (part-time, without pay) and a full-time chairman govern the unit.

Urban Renewal Citizens Advisory Committee.

            This group of nine citizens was appointed by the Mayor in 1960. Its main function is to provide the Mayor and Council with an independent source of advice and assistance on matters relating to the urban renewal program. The Committee has met monthly since its inception.

Committee on Minority Housing.

            This committee was appointed by the Mayor early in 1962 in order to meet a new federal requirement for recertification of urban renewal progress. The Committee has nine members, all citizens of White Plains. The responsibility of the Committee is to see that minority group families living in the area to be rebuilt obtain good relocation housing in an area, if possible, in which they want to live.

Non-Governmental Actors

White Plains Citizens Housing Council.

            This organization was started by some leading citizens of White Plains in 1959 for the purpose of promoting new housing in the city. The group was most interested in generating additional public housing for those families whose homes were severely deteriorated. In the summer of 1961, when Urban Renewal plans were made public, the Council focused its attention on the relocation housing problem and took a strong stand against the centralization of all public housing in one area.

The Democratic Party.

            The Democrats have never held power in White Plains and, on many issues, adopt a “gadfly” stance towards the Republican powers. On the question of Urban renewal in general, the Democrats have provided a kind of “loyal opposition;” that is, they are committed to the program and its goals, but regularly criticize the means. The have been particularly vehement with their criticisms of the choice of relocation sites.

The Reporter Dispatch.

            This is the only newspaper of any consequence in the city of White Plains. The paper is highly consistent in its Republican orientation both on the city level and in the offices of the county-wide chain. The Reporter Dispatch has strongly supported urban renewal but has been a severe critic of the city’s relocation housing program. Almost everyone in White Plains depends solely on this newspaper for information about what is going on in the city.

The Board of Education.

            As previously mentioned, the city’s school board has successfully presented and implemented relatively progressive integration program for the public schools. Its primary interest in the relocation housing problem has been the preservation of public school integration.

 

 

Parent Teacher Associations.

PTA groups, acting individually and in affiliation through the White Plains Council of Parent-Teacher Associations, have been concerned with the selection of relocation sites since late 1961. Their interest has, in general, been to avoid the overburdening of any one school district with the low-income families to be relocated.         

Urban League Committee on Urban Renewal.

            The Urban League remains the only civil rights organization in White Plains of any size and significance. Still, the group has a surprisingly small membership with little active participation. The Committee on Urban Renewal and the Housing Committee of the Urban League were both chaired by Myron Isaacs, and energetic and capable worker who persisted in his attempt to insure an equitable and rational choice of relocation sites throughout the housing controversy. The Urban League in White Plains is, for the most part, run by as many white as Negro citizens.

Neighborhood Associations.

            Several residential neighborhood associations were intimately, often passionately involved with the relocation site issue. Almost invariably involvement was for the purpose of deterring the construction of relocation housing in or near the particular neighborhood. In some cases, when total prevention became obviously impossible, the efforts of the neighborhood groups were redirected towards attempting to reduce the number of dwelling units to be included on the site. The most active neighborhood groups were: (1) The North Broadway Association (North end, 2000 members); (2) The Woodcrest Heights Association (North end, 150 members); (3) The Carhart Association (downtown periphery); (4) The Gedney Park Association (South end).

 

Analysis of the Selection of Public Housing Sites

            The intention of this, the major section of the study, is two-fold. First the writer will attempt to untangle and to render comprehensible the intricate concatenation of events that lead, over a period of almost six ears, to the decisions made by the common Council of White Plains as to where to locate the new public housing necessitated by urban renewal. Secondly, the writer strives to treat the history of these events, and decisions analytically; that is, to go beyond a superficial and journalistic narrative in order to determine the essential factors that ultimately lead the Council to act as they did.

            It would, of course, be extravagantly pretentious of the student to endeavor to attribute causal characteristics to any of the ostensibly contingent factors. Rather, the level of analysis always emphasized “what appears to have influenced decisions” rather than “what certainly has determined decisions.” In this way, no ultimate truths will be discovered. But, hopefully, some interesting hypotheses and significant insights will emerge concerning how and why a series of important decisions were made in the city of White Plains. The goal, then, is heuristic rather than conclusive.

            Underlying the following chronological treatment of the public housing controversy in White Plains are certain key analytical questions. These questions served three interrelated functions for the writer: they guided the research so as to anchor the mass of data to some coherent theme; secondly, they allowed for the organization of the study so that what is meaningful to the social scientist – the regularities and the generalities – tends to become more evident; finally, they operated to aid the writer in establishing a level of hypothetical explanation as opposed to pure description.

                        The analytical questions are:

1)    What role did the various actors play?

2)    Who comprised the decisional unit in the selection of sites?

3)    Who attempted to influence the decisions?

4)    How did the potential “influencers” perceive their vested interests?

5)    How did they go about attempting to have their perceived interests translated into public policy? What were the channels of access to decision makers?

6)    To what degree has the interest of **** influence group been met and, as far as determinable, to what degree is this attributable to the group?

7)    Who has had (or not had) power and who has had (or not had) influence on this issue in White Plains? Why?

 

The relocation housing controversy in White Plains was ignited soon after the public announcement of preliminary plans for urban renewal around 1960. For the next six years, the flames of public debate blazed with varying intensity, often dwindling into no more than a meager glow for extended periods, only to be fanned by the efforts of a newly incensed interest group. To portray the citizenry as maintaining a frantic pitch of dissent over the six years would be a gross distortion. The great majority of the city’s residents never became involved at all and those who took an interest did so, for the most part, quite sporadically. Yet, some extremely vocal and vociferous voices did emerge at times – thus warranting the term controversy.

The issues at stake in the relocation housing problem changed or were modified several times over the course of six years. The first issue to elicit any public response turned on the intention of the Common Council – as expressed in the preliminary renewal plans in 1960 to centralize all relocation in one section of the area to be redeveloped (hereafter referred to as the Urban Renewal Area). The outcry of sundry groups was aimed at the disadvantages of centralized relocation plan and the plea came forth for a “scatter-site” program – a concept, as we shall see, that grew to have a distinct and separate meaning for almost every interest group.

 When, late in 1962,13 The Common Council reversed its initial stand and began to advocate several relocation sites outside of the Urban Renewal Area, the nature of community debate shifted; the new focus became the precise location of public housing. As Milton Longhorn, President of the 2000-member North Broadway Association, stated:

                        “Public housing in White Plains is a big, bad bird flying over the town. It

                        flies around from place to place and whenever it shows any sign of

                        landing in the area, the natives come out and make noise to drive it

                        away.”14

 

Most recently, the subject of greatest controversy has been the size (i.e., number of dwelling units) of the public housing to be built on a particular site. Thus, as the recipient neighborhoods have reconciled themselves to the presence of low-income housing, they have re-channeled their efforts towards keeping the buildings as small as possible.

The decisions with which this study is most fundamentally concerned, then, are: first, the Common Council’s reversal in 1962 away from the original plan of centralized housing within the area to several sites outside of the area; and secondly, the selection, by the Council, of two specific locations for public housing from an array of over twenty-five alternatives.15

Preliminary urban renewal plans – as stated and made public in 1961 – called for almost all relocation housing (300 low-oncome units and 225 middle-income units) to be constructed in a residential super-block north of Barker Avenue.16 Thus, the original plan as presented to the citizens of White Plains, included almost all relocation housing within the downtown area to be redeveloped.

Opposition to this policy was not long in coming. The first barrage of dissent was discharged in the closing weeks of 1961 and during January 1962. Probably the first group to take a stand against centralization of housing was the White Plains Citizens’ Housing Council – an ad hoc group of well-respected citizens. This group had no apparent vested interest other than its stated goals of the promotion of decent housing for all the people of the city. The Housing Council adopted two related courses of action to try to influence the Mayor and the Common Council. First, it researched the alternatives to a centralized program and, in December of 1961, presented a report to the Mayor and the Common Council. Secondly, member of the Council and well-known White Plains architect, explained:

                       

“We tried to promote a general community backing for the locations we had in mind. Over a period of several months in early 1962, we appeared in front of PTA groups, neighborhood Associations, etc. At the end of this campaign, which the newspaper covered well, we were able to present a kind of scrapbook to the Mayor and Council showing them the various groups that had endorsed our plan.”17

           

When Heidtman finally did meet directly with the Mayor and three members of the Council in March, 1962, he found that re received “a fairly sympathetic audience.”18

The Housing Councils’ strategy – to attempt to influence a large number of voters – probably appears more successful than it actually was (a number of other groups in the city had been awakened by the issue of centralization simultaneously, and quite independent of the Housing Council). Yet it is undeniable that Heidtman’s attempts to galvanize voters against centralization and the concomitant publicity served to compel the Mayor and Common Council to reflect on their original decision.

Heidtman appeared with Kenneth Allebach – the city’s Urban Renewal Director – at a public meeting sponsored by the Battle Hill PTA on January 3, 1962. This meeting was highly significant for several reasons. Although the city administration was still publicly committed to centralizing housing in a 15-acre area north of Barker Avenue, Allebach went on record as saying:

“Personally, I agree with Mr. Heidtman and the people who say that scatter-housing is socially the most desirable method of relocation. But there is a considerable difference between what is theoretically desirable and what is administratively workable.”19

           

            Allebach also indicated that he thought that “a ground-swell of public sentiment” could

bring about a change in the proposed relocation plan.20

            It appears that what Allebach meant by “administratively workable” was “politically feasible.” He left little doubt in anyone’s mind where his own convictions rested. By publically encouraging the work Heidtman’s Housing Council, Allebach further indicated that he would be in favor, in fact would welcome, a bombardment of public opinion in opposition to the Mayor and Common Council’s program.

            To understand the Urban Renewal Director’s somewhat courageous stand at this time, it is necessary to say something about the man, himself. Allebach is a highly qualified professional housing and urban renewal expert who was brought to White Plains from Philadelphia where he had a high-level position in that city’s housing program. In his new job, he was an expert, a professional who was compelled to work within a government run largely by part-time amateurs. Allebach is not hesitant to talk about government in the suburbs:

“The decision-making process is very slow. They are not sophisticated people; they are not people who sit down and blue-print a plan for a long period of time after carefully thinking it out.”21

 

From his considerable experience in the field of housing, Allebach recognized the dangers of concentrated relocation. A very basic tenet of public administration – that administrative officials are constantly seeking support from sources independent of the elected officials to whom they are legally responsible and consequently court potential supporters – indicates that Allebach may have encouraged the advocates of scatter-sites for the purpose of leverage against the Mayor and the Common Council. This explanation, however, seems unlikely when the virtual political invulnerability of the Mayor and the Councilmen is considered. The more probable interpretation is that the Urban Renewal Director was merely expressing what his thought to be the most rational solution to the housing question. Furthermore, there is a real possibility that Allebach’s relative unfamiliarity, at that time, with governmental practices in White Plains – almost never to differences of opinion within the Council or the Executive come to the public attention – lead him to speak with unusual candor. One leading and knowledgeable citizen of the city claims that Allebach was ultimately “called upon the carpet” by the Mayor for his public statements at the Battle Hill meeting.22

            This is not to say, however, that Allebach did not favor public dissent to the original centralization plan. In answer to the question of whether the objection of citizen groups to the centralized housing program made his job of persuading the Common Council and Mayor an easier one, he explained:

            “Only to the extent that I could say, ‘look, you have the support of this group, that group, and the other group.’ In general, I was able to bring considerably more substantive arguments to the Council in support of the scatter-site philosophy than the lay citizens groups.”23

            Several other interests in White Plains registered their protests to centralized housing at about the same time (early in 1962) as the White Plains Citizens’ Housing Council. Probably the most significant among these were the PTA groups in the city. These associations of parents and teachers acted separately – through their individual school district organizations – and jointly – through the city-wide Council of Parent-Teacher Associations which had found, late in 1961, a special committee on relocation housing.

            The vested interest of the PTA groups was obviously to prevent the racial imbalance in schools that single-site relocation would undoubtedly engender. The PTA’s used two separate methods to have their perceived interests translated into a public policy change. First, several of the individual groups and the joint federation of groups adopted strongly worded resolutions and issued public statements favoring the use of scatter-sites. Secondly, several PTA groups attempted to enlist the support of the Board of Education in their opposition to housing centralization the downtown area.  The Board of Education remained publicly uncommitted at that time and throughout the relocation controversy. Whatever stance the Board may have taken behind the scenes was never clear to this student. However, it seems likely that the Board made lucid to the Mayor and the Council their unequivocal commitment to the maintenance of racial balance in the public schools throughout. On one occasion Board of Education President Andres Stevenson asserted:

            “The Board of Education is committed to a program of maintaining racial balance in the public schools…While, the decisions regarding housing sites are not within the jurisdiction of the Board of Education, the Board of Education has advised the Mayor and the Common Council of its racial balance plan and the effects of relocation housing.”24

            Neighborhood PTA groups also provided energetic backing for a scatter-site program. One group, the Ridgeway School PTA – located in the 100% White, upper-middle class southern section of the city – went so far as to adopt a resolution, by a slim majority, welcoming a public housing unit in their school district.25 The resolution was introduced to the group by Myron Isaacs, a crack lawyer, who was also chairman of the Urban League’s Committee on Urban Renewal. Isaacs, along with Heidtman and the Citizens Housing Council, was responsible for the inception of the scatter-site philosophy in White Plains. His Ridgeway PTA resolution was highly significant for two reasons. First, it dramatically demonstrates the widely diverse interpretations of “scatter-site.” Isaacs, at this early date, envisioned many locations with small numbers of dwelling units.26 Members of the city administration and the Common Council, on the other hand, thought of “scatter-site” in terms of two or three public housing (and two or three less “objectionable” middle-income housing) apartment buildings located somewhere other than in the URA. As Urban Renewal Director Allebach has been wont to point out, low-rise, small relocation housing is precluded in White Plains because of the high cost of land.27

            The second significant element in Isaac’s resolution is that a relocation site in the Ridgeway school district would have breached an informal yet highly regarded line across Bryant Avenue – a line that has successfully isolated the southern part of the city from all but White residents. In March of 1964, the Mayor announced that one of several relocation sites would be on the corner of Bryant Avenue, on city-owned land. Although this site was quickly endorsed by all relevant city officials, the administration abandoned consideration of the site a few months later claiming that deed restrictions on the land could not be eliminated or circumvented.28 Isaacs, himself a lawyer, thought that other factors were involved:

“Deed restrictions, like any other property interest, can be condemned for a public purpose. This particular restriction was a short-term one, and I don’t think that an Administration determined to use the site would be kept from doing so by the restriction. I know that there were activities by some of the neighborhood organizations in the southern part of town, making private representations to the Mayor and Council in opposition to that site. I am inclined to believe that those representations were more important than any other factor in bringing about the abandonment of that site. I don’t see any practical obstacle other than the political one.”29

 

Richard Maass, Chairman of the Mayor’s Committee on Minority Housing agreed with Isaacs view.30 Mayor Hendey, however, later reflected that although there was pressure from the south section of the city, the Common Council would have gone along with this site for middle-income housing (the original proposal was for public housing).31 Thus, with the abrogation of the Bryant Avenue site in 1964, the invitation of the Ridgeway School PTA and, more significantly, the possibility of utilizing the segregated southern section of the city for relocation were summarily rejected.

            This digression from the initial analysis of the centralization – scatter-site controversy is worthwhile for two reasons. First, it demonstrates what lies at the very base of the relocation issue: racial and economic discrimination. Secondly, it points to an instance where a neighborhood group – the Gedney Park Association – has been successful in deterring the publicly stated plans of the Mayor and Council. Even if we accept Mayor Hendey’s contention that in the final analysis the deed restrictions were the primary obstacle, he also admitted that the Council would have only agreed on middle-income housing for the area, a reformation of public policy that can only be attributed to the outcry of the politically powerful and financially wealthy Gedney Park residents.

            The question to be asked now is: what effect, if any, did the opposition of the PTA groups, the Citizens Housing Council, the Urban League, etc. have on the city’s original proposal to centralize housing in the U.R.A.? The answer, or a strong indication of what the answer would be, came only a few weeks after the various interest groups had made public their protests. On January 17, 1962, the Urban Renewal Advisory Committee – a group of citizens appointed by the Mayor and generally considered a captive of City Hall – added its support to the scatter-site philosophy.32 It is almost inconceivable that this group would have taken such a stand without the cognizance and probably the approval of the Mayor. The resolution of the Committee urged the reconsideration of the original plan; furthermore, the Advisory Committee specifically suggested that the Common Council make studies of the sites suggested by Heidtman’s group, the Citizens Housing Council, thus confirming the impact of that group’s effort.33

            The boost given to a scatter-site program by the Citizens Advisory Committee – indicating to many people that the Mayor’s support was imminent – apparently elicited an adverse reaction from neighborhoods that suddenly felt threatened. Although no city group or neighborhood association took a stand – publicly – against scatter housing, the student is lead to believe that there were private objections made to the Mayor by panicky citizens. Only two weeks after the Advisory Committee’s suggestion to review the centralized housing plan, the Mayor issued a public statement, speaking for himself and the Common Council, vehemently opposing the spread of multi-family construction (i.e. apartment houses) into stable, one-family residential areas.34 Although he did not mention public housing in particular, his reference to the protection of property values coupled with the public outcries of the preceding weeks in favor of scattering relocation housing around White Plains leaves little doubt as to his intentions. The Mayor’s statement did not preclude scatter-sites but did severely limit the possible locations.

            Urban Renewal Director Allebach later claimed that the Mayor’s intent was to “reassure White Plains that planning would be rational and that nothing drastic would be done.”35 It appears to the writer that Allebach’s explanation is slightly euphemistic; that is, the purpose of the Mayor’s comment seemed to be to quell the voices of opposition – those citizens who perceived the scatter-site philosophy as a threat to their own neighborhoods.

            Several interests in the city misinterpreted the Mayor’s statement to be an unqualified negation of the scatter-site concept. The Democratic City Committee in a public statement pointed out that the Administration “is still not committed to a policy of scatter-housing, a policy publicly favored by the Democratic Party during recent campaign.”36 The urban League also condemned Hendey’s statement as a reinforcement of rather than a destruction of the “invisible walls (of segregation)” in the community.37

            The Reporter Dispatch, the only newspaper of significance in the city, praised the Mayor in an editorial:

“Although they did not mention it, the seven elected leaders of the community (the Mayor and the Council) left no doubt in anyone’s mind that they were acting to make the city’s feeling known in no uncertain terms on the matter of extreme concepts of “scatter housing” for the urban renewal relocation project.

There have been many views expressed on ‘scatter housing’ … but it seems that the vast majority of the people of White Plains are as concerned with maintaining the type of community in which they are living as they are with fulfilling the very praiseworthy aims of racial balance in the schools”38 (emphasis mine)

 

            The newspaper, then, construed the Mayor’s statement as a rejection of the “extreme” aspects of a scatter-site program – and with this it heartily agreed. But in order to approach an understanding of this editorial stance, it is necessary to say something of the role the Reporter Dispatch has traditionally played in the city.

            The Reporter Dispatch is a Republican newspaper that, first and foremost, backs the Republican Administration. Very rarely does the paper oppose in toto a basic policy of the Mayor and the Common Council. The question may be raised, then, as to why the Reporter Dispatch opposed the scatter-site program, even when the Mayor and the Common Council publicly committed themselves to it. One answer is offered by the reporter who covered the City Hall “beat” during much of the housing controversy:

“I have not known the paper to oppose an important policy of the Council. Therefore, when the Common Council embarks on a progressive program such as urban renewal, which was originally generated by the Democrats, it is not the total policy of urban renewal that is questioned but the progressive aspects of the program.

 

Also, it must be pointed out that 90% of its news in this area is obtained by press release, 10% of its news is background, background to the hard news lead. Almost never does a reporter seek a scoop. There is very little honest delving into the workings of city government.”39

 

At another time during the housing controversy, the Reporter Dispatch vehemently opposed a decision of the Mayor and Council. This will be treated later.

            For the purposes of this study, it is highly significant that the newspaper has failed dismally in influencing relocation policy. When Mayor Hendey was asked whether he thought the paper’s opposition to scatter-site housing might have made his eventual support of it politically unwise, he replied:

“Politics as far as this Council goes doesn’t enter into it. This is not campaign talk or anything like that. We’re all residents of White Plains and none of us have any political ambitions. We want to live here after we get through our terms and we want to make White Plains the best small city we can. Personally, I don’t think we worry whether the paper is going to come out for us or against us. When we make a decision, we let the chips fall and if it’s wrong, we’re to blame. But we try to make the decision which is best for the whole city.”40

 

Aside from confirming Allebach’s comment (related earlier) about the unsophisticated nature of government in the suburbs, this statement must, contrary to the Mayor’ claim, be analyzed politically as it raises a highly political question: why were the Mayor and Council able to ignore, with impunity, the criticisms and position of the only widely-read local newspaper?

            The answer is three-fold. First, as mentioned previously, the Mayor and Councilmen have little to fear from the Democratic opposition. Moreover, they were well aware that the newspaper would be on their side at election time, regardless of any political differences in the interim. Secondly, the newspaper has never been very successful in influencing the elected officials, because the elected officials are convinced that they have a tight hold over the paper (e.g. news by press release). Finally, the Reporter Dispatch, according to ex-reporter Whittemore, supposed that the majority of readers would oppose the scatter-site plan simply because it gives the impression that it is going to disrupt the community.41 This reaction never materialized and the sale source of community-wide communications in the city was left screaming in the wilderness.

            Despite Mayor Hendey’s variously interpreted statement on scatter-housing (February 1, 1962), it was abundantly clear by the summer of that year that the city officials had little desire to adhere to the original plan of centralized relocation housing. The important question, of course, is why the Mayor and the Common Council reversed their initial plans for one huge site in favor of several sites scattered around the city.

            The most feasible explanation for the policy turnabout is the following: Although the Mayor and Councilmen were aware of the relative advantages of several scattered sites, they misconstrued what the public reaction to such a proposal would be. The Mayor had been in consultation with Urban Renewal officials from New Haven, Hartford, Providence, and Boston on the questions of relocation programs.42 Moreover, he had been continually exposed to the persuasive arguments of a housing expert – his own Urban Renewal Director, Kenneth Allebach. Yet, until the outcry of public sentiment – PTA groups, Citizens Housing Council, Urban League, Democratic Party, etc. – late in 1961 and throughout 1962, the Mayor appeared reluctant to broach the delicate subject of dispersed relocation sites to the community. Urban Renewal was unquestionably the largest undertaking in the history of the city and it seems possible that the Mayor did not want to risk upsetting the tractable consensus on the total program by proposing a potentially controversial relocation plan. When it became apparent, however, that a significant number of citizens were not only opposed to highly concentrated relocation north of Barker Avenue but were adamant in their support of scattered-sites, the Mayor was able to reverse his position without fear of the adverse repercussions he initially anticipated. In short, a scatter-site plan would not endanger the entire programs.

            The writer’s conclusion – that the elected officials’ eventual support of scatter-site plan was the result of citizen group backing of a program that the officials originally perceived as theoretically desirable but politically perilous – is not without validation. When asked if city groups had any influence in the change of policy, the Mayor replied:

            “If anyone influenced us, it was the schools. We discussed housing and relocation with them in terms of their own plans.”43

 

When questioned as to whether the Urban Renewal Staff, particularly Director Allebach, favored a scatter-site policy before he and the Council subscribed to such a policy, the Mayor responded:

            “I don’t know the timing on it, but I think that all of us had the same ideas that he had. It was through his assistance that we did get to talk to the people of the Urban Renewal Administration (in Washington). Also, he knew men at New Haven, Hartford and places like that.

            There were some on the Council whose minds were made up at the same time as his was, but with others he had some influence, yes.”44

 

            Hugh Leslie, a member of the Common Council, was more vague about who provided the influence leading to the city’s reversal policy:

            “It came from several people. I think the Mayor had as much to do with it as anyone; also, Allebach and the members of the Council. I think the preponderance of thinking her in the city, from the Minority Housing Committee, the urban renewal people, etc. favored scatter-sites. It’s hard to put your finger on who had more influence than someone else. It came more as a community solution to the problem.”45

 

            Urban Renewal Director Kenneth Allebach provided greater confirmation on the effectiveness of civic groups in influencing the Mayor and the Council. When asked if the pressures applied by various city groups induced the Mayor and the Council to reconsider and eventually alter their original stance, he answered:

            “Sure, No question about it. The Mayor and the Council got the very clear impression that they had a broad range of support for this program or as political people they wouldn’t have supported it.”46

            Thus it appears that despite the Mayor’s assertion that “politics doesn’t enter into it,”47 the decision to abandon the preliminary plan to centralize most housing in one super-block would not have been made were it not for the vociferous protestations of several civic groups. There was no public announcement of the change in policy by any member of the city administration. Rather, the indication received confirmation when, in 1963, the Citizens Advisory Committee, the White Plains Housing Authority, the Planning Board and the Minority Housing Committee (appointed by the Mayor in March 1962) began to consider sites for public housing in several locations throughout the community. That these official groups would undertake such an endeavor without the explicit approval of the Mayor and Council is inconceivable.

            Not all six members of the Common Council were convinced of the values of a scatter-site program. According to Richard Maass, whom the Mayor appointed Chairman of the Minority Housing Committee in 1962, only three councilmen and the Mayor had been persuaded of the wisdom of dispersed relocation sites.48 Councilman McMahon admitted that he and Councilman Brewster would have preferred to see the housing remain in the Urban Renewal Area.49 However, the tradition of local government in White Plains calls for the Council and the Mayor to present a united front to the community; for this reason, most citizens of the city were never aware that disagreement existed within the Common Council. The majority – 3 Councilmen and the Mayor – were in favor of a modified scatter-site plan and any substantive discussion to the contrary took place only in executive session.

            At the beginning of 1963, the officials of the city of White Plains were confronted with two interrelated problems in their relocation housing program. Above all, the relocation plan had to be finalized and submitted to the federal government in order that the Central Renewal Project could receive the requisite funds to enter the execution stage. Secondly, alternative scatter-sites had to be studied so that decision could be made as to the precise location of the relocation housing. Theoretically, a resolution of the second problem should have preceded the filing of the federal application. In reality, this was not possible. Thus, in Mayor Hendey’s words:

            “We had learned from other communities that had been through the process of urban renewal that if we waited to get our housing settled before we filed the final plan, it would take a good many years. Thus, it was agreed that we would file a plan with all housing in the north end of the city with the definite understanding that little if any would go there because we didn’t want another Winbrook. The Agency, the Advisory Committee, and the Council members all agreed that we wanted to spread it around a bit.”50

 

The Mayor and the Urban Renewal Director had received assurances from the state and federal authorities that they would not be bound to an application plan that shoed all housing centralized within the URA. Meanwhile, the search for appropriate sites outside of the URA began.

            The process of selecting specific sites for public housing was highly complex in White Plains. The anticipated controversy and antagonistic reaction of affected neighborhood groups was further complicated by the disparity between the federal application and the publically stated plans of the city officials. Never, in fact, was the Mayor able to adequately persuade all segments of the community that the centralized relocation plan as elaborated in the federal application was merely and expediency.

            Indeed, two full years after the Mayor and the Council made it apparent that the proposed super-block of housing within the URA had been rejected, there remained considerable skepticism within the city. At a public hearing in June of 1964 – held, according to law, to discuss urban renewal in its entirety – Lloyd Miller, president of the small but energetic Woodcrest Heights neighborhood association, delivered a lengthy and detailed statement on the relocation issue. He said in part:

“While verbal assurances have been given that those responsible for Urban Renewal no longer plan to use the Barker Avenue site as shown in the plan before the Common Council tonight, the fact remains that the Barker Avenue site is still in the plan we are called upon to approve tonight, two full years after the necessity for alternatives become clearly evident…

We reject the idea that a deadline is more important than the plan itself. This is expediency not the type of good planning a 40-million-dollar project deserves.”52

 

            The Woodcrest Heights Association together with the neighboring but much larger North Broadway Association was intensely persistent in its quest to deter any relocation housing north of Barker Avenue. These two neighborhood groups had a clear perception of their vested interests: property values and neighborhood integrity would be threatened by large numbers of low-income families in the Northern part of the city (see appendix #2).

            Although the natives of the two north-end neighborhood groups were probably solely economic, they were able to derive a considerable portion of their arguments for sociological date pertaining to the adverse effects of highly concentrated relocation housing. There lies a certain irony here in that two neighborhood groups that feared the spread of Negroes and other low-income families into an area adjoining their own, found themselves in an unlikely alliance with the Urban League, the Minority Housing Committee, and other liberal groups which opposed the centralized housing plan for totally different reasons.

            The strategy of the two north-end groups – which to a great extent was developed and implemented by the turbulent Mr. Miller – was simple. They attempted to “make noise” and this influenced the politicians who they felt, could not afford the adverse publicitiy.53 Furthermore, they sought to establish alliances with other city groups who, they believed, shared their stakes in blocking housing in the northern part of the city. Indeed, the affiliation between the 2000 member North Broadway Association and the 150 member Woodcrest Association deftly maneuvered the powerful North Broadway group into taking a much stronger position than they wanted to.54 In addition, the North-end groups attempted to elicity a statement from the Board of Education to the effect that centralized housing would irrevocably upset the racial balance in the city’s schools (see appendix #3). The School Board, however, reported that it was unlikely that any extra transportation would be required to maintain racial balance in the public schools if relocation housing were centralized north of Barker Avenue.55 This not only represented a setback to the north-end groups, but emphasized the School Board’s independence of the city administration which, by this time, was unequivocally committed to a scatter-site program.

            Miller, who characteristically held a “conspiracy theory” of government, refused to accept the School Board’s statement as an objective evaluation. He remains convinced that the “city fathers” still, in 1965, wanted to locate the relocation housing in one super-block in the northern part of the city and that the School Board adopted its stance to avoid antagonizing the city “power structure.” Miller also interpreted the newspaper’s support of centralized housing as a reflection of what the “power structure” really wanted.56 When confronted with the fact that virtually every city official had publicly stated that relocation housing would be dispersed, Miller replied:

“The Reporter Dispatch reflects the Common Council, the Mayor, the Chamber of Commerce – the power structure if you will – and this (centralized housing), is what the power structure would like to do. It is inconceivable to me that the newspaper is acting by itself. Part of the power structure is behind this. If they got any sort of favorable reaction or no unfavorable reaction to this (centralized housing), despite the avowed intent for scatter-site housing, there would have been a change.”56

 

            When it became totally clear that not all relocation housing would be centralized in one area, the north-end neighborhood groups shifted the target of their opposition. During the Winter of 1962, the city decided to undertake a second, much smaller Urban Renewal Project on Lake Street, several miles from the downtown area. The purpose of this “vest-pocket” renewal was to clear an area for a public housing project. The Lake Street project was to be at the base of a large hill in the very eastern part of the city. The Woodcrest Heights neighborhood spreads over the hill and is theoretically adjacent to – but actually well separated by the sloping terrain – the proposed public housing site. The construction plan originally called for an 100+ unit, twelve story building and was then revised to 95 units and ten stories. The new focus of the Woodcrest Heights and North Broadway Associations was to persuade the Common Council to reduce the size of the Lake Street project.

            The methods employed differed only slightly from those utilized to deter the centralized housing program. In April of 1963 Lloyd Miller – then chairman of the Woodcrest Heights Urban Renewal Committee – wrote to the Mayor conveying the sentiments of the Association on the Lake Street project (see appendix #4). Then, in autumn of 1963 attempted to obstruct action on the Lake Street site at a Common Council meeting. After achieving nothing at the Council meeting, Miller presented his arguments to the Planning Board. Here, he met with a small measure of success, effectively delaying the Board’s approval of the site for one month. But on December 18, 1963 the Planning Board, as was inevitable, approved a ten story, 95-unit project for Lake Street. Miller’s comment after the fiery session: “Our goose is cooked. They are going to approve it.”57

            At first glance, it may appear that the North-end neighborhood groups were successful in their attempts to influence public decision making. Relocation housing, after all, will not be centralized in the northern section of the absolute size of the Lake Street public housing project was slightly reduced. In reality, however, the protest actions of these groups were probably negligible, except in so far as they contributed to the greater voice of the entire city in opposing centralized housing. Urban Renewal Director Kenneth Allebach commented on the ostensible effectiveness of the north-end groups:

“I think that the success is more apparent than real. You can be pretty well assured of success when you are opposing something that the public decision-making body has already told you that it wasn’t going to do.”58

 

In short, although some of the perceived interests of the North Broadway and Woodcrest Heights Associations were ultimately served, the probability is that this success could not be attributed directly to the efforts of the groups.

            The answer to the more significant question – why the large north end neighborhood groups were so impotent in their attempts to influence the city’s officials – lies in fact of “one-party government” in White Plains. The northern part of the city had traditionally voted 8-1 or 9-1 in support of the Republican ticket59 and the Mayor and Council had little to fear in the way of losing votes no matter, within limits, what they did. Indeed, that Mayor Hendey could afford to make the following statement demonstrates the total lack of political leverage (or threat) at the disposal of the north end neighborhood groups:

“The neighborhood groups had no influence on us. We had made this decision on our own. Generally, these groups are more or less selfish and would not see the interests of the whole city.”60

 

            A brief review of the decision to construct a large (175 units) public housing project on the corner of Schuyler and DeKalb Avenues – an area directly adjacent to the business section of town and several blocks from the URA – is useful to re-emphasize the considerable policy-making latitude of the Mayor and the Common Council even in the face of vociferous neighborhood and newspaper editorial opposition.

            The Schuyler-DeKalb site was first suggested by the Citizens Housing Council as part of their original plea for a scatter-site program early in 1962. In August of 1963, the Citizens’ Advisory Committee and the White Plains Housing Authority publicly supported the use of the site for public housing.61 The approval of the Housing Authority at this point may be interpreted as tantamount to approval by the elected officials of the city. Although in principle the Housing Authority is charged with the construction of all public housing including participation in the decisions as to site selection, in practice the agency has done little more over the years than manage the existing law income housing. On the question of site selection, then, the Authority acts only as a “rubber-stamp” for the Mayor and the Council.

            An expected chorus of complaints arose from the residents of the Carhart neighborhood – the area where the suggested project would be built. This section of White Plains, once characterized by fine, old homes and populated by some of the city’s best families had begun to degenerate. Rooming houses – a fairly certain symptom of incipient deterioration – are becoming increasingly common in the area. Still, the objections of the Carhart Association’s membership were loud, if not as well organized or articulated, as were those of the north end neighborhood groups on the question of centralized housing. The usual arguments of overcrowded, traffic problems, lack of recreational space, and insufficient school facilities62 were employed. There was, however, little attempt to mask the fact that the possible reduction in property values caused, it was believed, by Negro proliferation rested at the base of the Association’s objections.

            Also opposing the Schuyler-DeKalb site with, it must be added, highly unusual ferocity was the White Plains Reporter Dispatch. The violent dissension of the daily newspaper was unusual for several reasons. First, as pointed out earlier, the paper rarely criticizes an important policy decision of the city officials. Secondly, the Reporter Dispatch, only seven months before waging a scathing editorial battle against the site, assumed a mild position in favor of the site.63 And thirdly, the April 26, 1965 editorial opposing the project in the Carhart section was so fiercely acerbic in its content and received such high priority in its presentation that it represented, without doubt, the most intense editorial crusade by the newspaper in many years. Entitled “This Planning Monstrosity must be avoided, “the editorial and its accompanying serial photographs covered most of the first page of the edition in which it appeared.

            The most widely given and authoritative explanation for the editorial lambasting of the Schuyler-DeKalb site is that considerable pressure was brought to bear on the newspaper by large advertising interests. Alexanders, B. Altmans, Saks Fifth Avenue and other sizeable department stores are all located in an area bordering the Carhart neighborhood. These stores purchase hundreds of thousands of dollars of advertising in the newspaper each year. When the implications of using the Schuyler-DeKalb site became clear to the executives of the various department stores, they were able to pressure the county-wide executives of the newspaper into a position of vehement opposition.64 The earlier editorial, moderately supporting use of the site, was probably written by the city editor who, in the final analysis, was superseded by his county-wide superiors.65

            Yet in the face of emotional pleas and acid accusations from the residents of the Carhart neighborhood, and despite the bitter protest of the Reporter Dispatch, the Common Council approved the Schuyler-DeKalb site on April 28, 1965 – only two days after the dissenting editorial appeared on the front page of the city’s newspaper. The procedure of the Council was unusual in that the final, publicly announced vote stood at 5-2 – thus breaking an unwritten, unstated principle that the Council as a whole supports the opinion of the majority unanimously, at least in public. Councilman McMahon, who along with Councilman Brewster voted against the site, point out:

            “I think that this is the toughest decision the Council has ever had to make. I do not exaggerate when I say that the members of the Council spent sleepless nights over this. It came to a point where something had to be done, and that was that. I think the Mayor himself, would have liked to find another site.”66

 

            An informed source later indicated that the original number of dissenting votes exceeded two, but that the Mayor “pulled the reigns” over other recalcitrant councilmen.67 Hugh Leslie, a Council member who finally voted in favor of the site, explained that he was initially opposed but that the determination of the Mayor and the position of the majority of the Council lead him to reconsider and ultimately change his vote.68

            That the Mayor and the Common Council ignored the strong objections of the Reporter Dispatch in approving the relocation site can be explained in terms of the overall impotence of the newspaper as an opinion leader in the community. The elected officials concluded correctly that even the massive editorial effort against the Schuyler-DeKalb site would little effect public sentiment. Throughout the eight years of urban renewal in White Plains, the Reporter Dispatch has been singularly in affectual in its attempts to influence public policy – from its abortive efforts to induce reversion to the original centralized housing plan to its futile attempts to mobilize support for or against a particular scatter-site.

            The insensitivity of the elected officials to the outcries of the enraged Carhart residences requires further explanation. The Carhart neighborhood Association had gone to extreme lengths to deter approval of the Schuyler-DeKalb project; yet, the Mayor and Council members were able to politically afford an indifferent attitude towards the protestations. The reason is fairly clear cut: The Carhart Association represented a relatively small neighborhood whose political influence had declined along with the physical character of the area. No longer do wealthy, prominent families populate the Carhart area; rather, first and second generation minority groups predominate. Moreover, the Carhart residents lacked support of other city interest groups in their objections. As Urban Renewal Director Allebach explained:

“In the case of the Carhart area, I think that the city stumbled accidentally on just the right technique to get the Schuyler-DeKalb site through; that was by first proposing a middle-income site on the corner of Bryant and Mamaroneck Avenues which brought down a storm of protest from all over the southern part of the city. Well, when several months later they abandoned that site and moved several blocks north to Schuyler-DeKalb, the Carhart neighborhood was left virtually alone in their opposition.”69

 

In short, after the voices to which the Mayor and the Council had to be sensitive were quelled by the abandonment of the Mamaroneck-Bryant site, the relatively weak voices of the Carhart members were almost totally isolated and thus ignorable.

           

 

 

Mrs. Rose Stipo, a leader of the Carhart group, articulated her frustrations:

“We had meetings with the Mayor, wrote letters, attended public hearings, and hired an attorney. But we found out later that we wasted our time, money, and breath. The decision had already been reached. Many of our members have already moved from the city, and our President and Vice President have quit and left.”70

 

 

Conclusion: Politics and Planning in White Plains

            This paper has been a case-study of how a medium size, eastern city grappled with the problems of relocation of new public housing projects. The stated purpose of the study was two-fold: to untangle and to render comprehensible the intricate concatenation of events that lead, over a period of almost six years, to the decisions made by The Common Council of White Plains as to where to locate the new public housing necessitated by urban renewal; and, to treat these decisions analytically in order to determine the essential factors that ultimately lead the council to act as it did.

            Both the preparatory research and the organization of the study on paper were guided by a set of analytical questions (see page 17). Hopefully, the probable answers to these questions – no claim is made for absolute truth – emerge from the body of this paper. Strictly drawn conclusions are superfluous to this, or any, case-study; therefore, this final section will be devoted to some general remarks on the nature of politics and planning in White Plains.

            The relocation program that was finally adopted by the Mayor and the Council may be considered a moderate, scatter-site plan. Although the original intention of centralizing all housing in one super-block was totally rejected, the alternative plan hardly indicated a commitment to a full-scale scatter policy. Rather, the Council decided to construct low-income housing in three, reasonably separate sections of the city.

            This should not be interpreted as a compromise between the position of those who advocated centralized relocation and those who called for small, low-rise apartments dispersed all around the community. The Mayor and the Council conceded almost nothing to the few voices that urged either of these alternatives. The vast preponderance of public opinion, however, did oppose locating all the new housing within the URA and this, coupled with the arguments of Urban Renewal Director Allebach and other professional experts, impelled the Mayor and Councilmen to act as they did.

            The decision to build a few. Relatively large public housing projects rather than many, well-dispersed small ones is usually explained in economic terms. Land costs are high in White Plains and, it is pointed out, high-rise construction is the only financially feasible method. Although this is probably true, certain social and political factors cannot be overlooked. About one half of the families to be relocated were Negro and social conditions in White Plains simply preclude, at this point, the integration of many neighborhoods. What is more, those areas of the city that would most stubbornly resist integration, appear to have the political influence necessary to prevent it (see page 27).

            Thus, in light of the outcry against centralization on the one hand and the fear of Negro proliferation backed up by significant political power on the other hand, the Common Council chose to expedient middle course: a few scattered relocation sites strategically located so as not to infringe on any “hallowed” neighborhood. The choice of the Carhart area for the Shuyler-DeKalb site may seem to be an exception but, as explained in the text, the opposition of the Carhart residents was sufficiently isolated to present no real political threat.

            The conclusion should not be drawn that the actions of the Common Council were merely the vector resultant of impinging political forces. Within the extremely broad limits of “no centralization” on one side and “no wholesale Negro proliferation” on the other, the elected officials retained a large amount of discretionary latitude. The Mayor and Councilmen – confident that as Republicans they would be re-elected no matter what, within the given limits, they decided – were able to ignore or only give “lip service” to most interests within the city. In fact, a recurring comment by the leaders of interest groups in the city was that the Council’s solicitation of public and group opinion was largely perfunctory, that public hearings were a sham, and that the elected officials irreversibly locked themselves into decisions before listening to public debate.

            Furthermore, the Common Council and the Mayor enjoyed almost complete independence from the various agencies and official committees concerned with the relocation problem. The White Plains Housing Authority was allowed no planning function and provided little more than a rubber stamp for Council decisions. The Citizens Advisory Committee offered some critical thought but never escaped, or attempted to escape, the control of elected officials. The Minority Housing Committee, established to aid in the relocation of minority-group families, tried at one point to expand its jurisdiction by suggesting specific housing sites. The chairman of the committee, however, resigned out of dire frustration in his relationship with the Common Council:

“They rarely asked us for our opinions, failed to respond to our suggestions, and frankly I resigned from a feeling of frustration.”71

 

The only governmental agency that wielded any influence over the Mayor and the Council was the Urban Renewal Agency. This, of course, is mostly the result of the highly effective and competent Director, Kenneth Allebach, who admits that even he worked almost four years before he won the full confidence of the elected officials.72

            Finally, the Mayor and the Councilmen never had their independence challenged by what was potentially the most influential interest group of all: the 3000 or so residents of the Urban Renewal Areas. For some reason these citizens – certainly the most affected by relocation policy – never organized to have their opinions heard. Indeed, it is unclear as to whether there existed a predominate opinion among this group at all. In general, the area residents appeared unconcerned with the location of the new public housing. The possible reasons behind this apathy suggest a starting point for what could be a very illuminating and provocative study.

            In conclusion, the decisions of the Mayor and Common Council of White Plains on the location of relocation housing sites have been made, within the state limits, without fear of political repercussions. The debate as to whether one-party government breeds efficiency and rationality or dogmatism and unresponsiveness is as old as democracy itself. The position of White Plains’ major proponent of urban renewal is clear:

            “Urban Renewal has succeeded in White Plains, so far as it can be said that we have succeeded, principally because we have enjoyed one-party government. The whole area of partisan bickering has been of no consequence to the decision-making process. Programs in other cities have been bogged down by political interference and political bickering. Because of the partisan nature of the approach to government in these, cities, the decision-making process had broken down completely. I sometimes shudder to think what will happen in White Plains if this one-party system is broken up before Urban Renewal gets into the ground.”73

 

 

 

 

Afterword

 

            The concern of the social scientist is with what is typical, regular, and recurrent. The findings of this study tend to contradict what other students have found in other cities faced with problems similar to those of White Plains. To conclude that for some mystical reason White Plains is unique does not provide a sufficiently scholarly explanation. Therefore, some hypotheses as to why events unraveled the way they did and decisions were reached the way they were will be offered. The studies used for comparison – and, to this student’s knowledge, the only research focused on problems comparable to those analyzed in White Plains – which is a study of three projects in New York City and Politics, Planning and the Public Interest by Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, which is an analysis of relocation decisions in Chicago in the early 1950’s.

            Some hypotheses which, upon much further investigation, might possibly reveal and explain the differences between White Plains and other cities in their modes of treating relocation question are:

1.     The time factor. White Plains confronted its relocation in the early and mid-1960’s, during a period when Civil Rights Revolution was at its apex. Chicago (and to some extent New York) dealt with their problems before Civil Rights was a popular issue and very few questions of a sociological nature were raised in deciding where to place public housing.

2.     The size of the city. White Plains is a small to medium sized city with a large middle-class. New York and Chicago – the two biggest urban areas in the country – are extremely heterogeneous and have only a small percentage of middle-class citizens. Middle-class residents of White Plains were largely responsible for the introduction of sociological criteria in choosing relocation sites.

3.     The governmental structure. White Plains has a strong City Council form of government with virtually no competing governmental centers of power. Chicago, according to Banfield and Meyerson, has not one but six city governments; and New York government, Davies points out, is a series of “semi-autonomous little worlds.” In short, White Plains government is characterized by an usually complete integration.

4.     One-party politics. White Plains is governed by one party with the elected officials chosen at large. Both Chicago and New York have dominant-party systems but officials are elected by and expected to serve specific constituencies.

5.     Criteria in choosing sites. The political invulnerability or elected officials in White Plains allowed them, within limits, to select relocation sites on the basis of what they perceived as being “good for the city as a whole.” In Chicago and New York, such decisions had to be made more on the basis of political compromise.

6.     Neighborhood groups. In New York and to a lesser extent in Chicago, neighborhood groups gained political access to some parts of the complex city governments and were able to influence site selection. In White Plains, the neighborhood groups were unable, for the most part, to effect the decisions of the only center of power – The Common Council.

7.     Mass Media. In New York the mass media – television and newspapers – were opinion leaders in determining the reaction of many people to urban renewal. White Plains has only one city-wide instrument of communication, the newspaper, which remained totally ineffective in influencing opinion through the struggle.

 

These hypotheses are set up to do no more than suggest differences between White Plains and other cities that may have had consequences on not only the way decisions were reached, but on the substantive nature of the decisions. Further investigation and detailed research would be necessary to prove or disprove the relevance and functionality of each hypothesis as an explanation of the unique way in which White Plains resolved its relocation problems.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Banfield, Edward C., and Meyerson, Martin. Politics, Planning and the Public Interest. Illinois: The Free Press, 1955.

 

Davies, J. Clarence, III. Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

 

Public Documents

City of White Plains. City Charter. 1915.

City of White Plains. Amendments to City Charter. 193601963.

The Central Renewal Project. Urban Renewal in White Plains. Printed by the City of White

Plains, 1964.

 

White Plains Common Council. Hearings: Central Renewal Project. June 10, 1964.

 

Reports

Wood, Elizabeth. A Survey of the Residents of the White Plains Central Renewal Project. City of White Plains 1965.

 

Newspapers

The Reporter Dispatch. White Plains, N.Y. 1960-1966.

 

Personal Interviews (all conducted during January, 1967)

Allebach, Kenneth. Director of the White Plains Urban Renewal Agency.

Fredman, Samuel. White Plains City Democratic Chairman.

Heidtman, William. Ex-president of the White Plains Citizens’ Housing Council.

Hendey, Richard. Mayor of the City of White Plains.

Isaacs, Myron. Chairman of the Urban League Committee on Urban Renewal.

Leslie, Hugh. Member of the Common Council of the City of White Plains.

Maass, Richard. Ex-Chairman of the Urban Renewal Minority Housing Committee.

McMahon, Francis. Member of the Common Council of the City of White Plains.

Miller, Lloyd. President of the Woodcrest Heights Association.

Stipo, Rose. Secretary of the Carhart Association.

Whittemore, Louis. Ex-Reporter for the White Plains Reporter Dispatch.

 

 

 

 

 

           

 

           

 

 

 

 

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1 White Plains, N.Y., Amendments to City Charter, Article VIII-K, Section 238-x

2 The Central Renewal Project, Urban Renewal in White Plains, p.10.

3 Elizabeth Wood, A Survey of Residents of the White Plains Central Renewal Project, White Plains, N.Y., City of, Oct. 1965, p. 40

4 Ibid. pp. 6-7

5 See Appendix #1.

 

6 The Central Renewal Project, p. 11.

7 Interview with Kenneth Allebach, Director of W.P.U.R.A., January, 1967.

8 Wood, pp. 40-41

9 Ibid., p. 22

10 Ibid., p. 41

11 Ibid., preface.

12 White Plains Reporter Dispatch, June 23, 1961, p. 1.

13 Interview, Kenneth Allebach, Director of W.P.U.R.A., Jan. 1967.

14 Reporter Dispatch (White Plains), March 16, 1965, p. 1

15 Reporter Dispatch, March 20, 1964.

16 Reporter Dispatch, Dec. 11, 1961, p. 1

17 Interview, William Heidtman, President of W.P.C.H.C., Jan, 1967.

18 Ibid.

19 Reporter Dispatch, January 3, 1962, p. 1

20 Ibid.

21 Interview, Kenneth Allebach, Director W.P.U.R.A., Jan., 1967.

22 Source asked to remain anonymous.

23 Interview, Kenneth Allebach, Jan., 1967.

24 Reporter Dispatch, March 2, 1965, p. 1.

25 Reporter Dispatch, Jan. 10, 1962, p. 1

26 Interview, Myron Isaacs, Chairman of Urban League Committee on Urban Renewal, Jan. 1967.

27 Reporter Dispatch, Feb. 4, 1964.

28 Interview, Kenneth Allebach, Director W.P.U.R.A., Jan. 1967.

29 Interview, Myron Isaacs, Chairman of Urban League Renewal Committee, Jan. 1967.

30 Interview, Richard Maass, Chairman of U.R. Minority Housing Committee, Jan. 1967

31 Interview. Richard Hendey, Mayor of White Plains, Jan. 1967.

32 Reporter Dispatch, Jan. 18, 1962, p. 1

33 Ibid.

34 Reporter Dispatch, Feb. 1, 1962, p. 1

35 Interview, Kenneth Allebach, Director W.P.U.R.A., Jan. 1967.

36 Reporter Dispatch, Feb. 26, 1962

37 Reporter Dispatch, Feb. 8, 1962

38 Reporter Dispatch, Feb. 2, 1962, Editorial Page.

39 Interview, Louis Whittemore, Ex-Reporter for Reporter Dispatch, Jan. 1967. (note: Whittemore left the paper on his own initiative and in very good standing.)

40 Interview, Richard Hendey, Mayor of White Plains, Jan. 1967.

41 Interview, Louis Wittemore, Ex-reporter for Reporter Dispatch, Jan. 1967

42 Interview, Mayor Richard Hendey, January 1967.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Interview, Hugh Leslie, Member of Common Council, Jan. 1967.

46 Interview, Kenneth Allebach, Director of WPURA, Jan. 1967.

47 See note #40.

48 Interview, Richard Maass, Chairman of Minority Housing Committee, Jan. 1967.

49 Interview, Francis McMahon, Member of Common Council, Jan.1967.

50 Interview, Mayor Richard Hendey, Jan 1967.

52 White Plains, Common Council, Hearings, Central Renewal Project, June 10, 1964.

53 Interview, Lloyd Miller, President of Woodcrest Heights Association, Jan. 1967.

54 Ibid.

55 Reporter Dispatch, Jan. 2, 1965, p. 1.

56 Interview, Lloyd Miller, President Woodcrest Heights Association, Jan. 1967.

 

57 Reporter Dispatch, December 14, 1963, p. 1.

58 Interview, Kenneth Allebach, Director W.P.U.R.A., Jan. 1967.

59 Interview, Samuel Fredman, City Democratic Chairman, Jan. 1967.

60 Interview, Richard Hendey, Mayor of White Plains, Jan. 1967.

61 Reporter Dispatch, August 21, 1963, p. 1.

62 Reporter Dispatch, Oct. 23, 1963, letters to the editor.

63 Reporter Dispatch, Sept. 14, 1964, editorial page.

64 Interview, Louis Whittemore, Ex-Reporter for Reporter Dispatch, Jan. 1967. An almost identical explanation was given by a high level city official who requested to remain anonymous.

65 Ibid.

66 Interview, Francis McMahon, Common Councilman of White Plains, Jan. 1967.

67 Source requested to remain anonymous.

68 Interview, Hugh Leslie, Common Councilman of White Plains, Jan. 1967.

69 Interview, Kenneth Allebach, Director W.P.U.R.A., Jan. 1967.

70 Interview, Mrs. Rose Stipo, Secretary of Carhart Association, Jan. 1967.

71 Interview, Richard Maass, ex-chairman of Minority Housing Committee, Jan. 1967.

72 Interview, Kenneth Allebach, Director W.P.U.R.A., Jan. 1967.

73 Interview, Kenneth Allebach, Director W.P.U.R.A., Jan., 1967.